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Wolfgang Wagner 								
University of Tübingen
Centre for International Relations/Peace and Conflict Studies
Melanchthonstraße 36
72074 Tübingen
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email: wolfgang.wagner@uni-tuebingen.de

Germany's Policy Towards the CFSP 
Rationalist and Constructivist Explanations

Paper prepared for presentation at the 1999 Annual Convention 
of the International Studies Association, 
Washington, D.C., February, 16^th to 20^th, 1999

I.	Introduction

A transfer of foreign policy-making competences from the member states to the European Union would move the latter further towards a federation. This may explain why even small steps towards a common European foreign policy have received broad public and scholarly attention. The extent to which foreign policy-making competences are transferred to the level of the European Union, the way in which the Commission and European Parliament (EP) are involved in a European foreign policy, the way in which decisions are taken and joint actions are financed -- all these constitutional questions have been negotiated by the member states.  Whereas the supranational actors play an important role in Community politics the member states remain the single most important actors in constitutional questions: At the intergovernmental conferences the Commission does not have the exclusive right of initiative that it enjoys in Community politics. The agenda is thus open to member states’ initiatives. For treaty reforms to come into force, every member state has to ratify the agreement according to its constitutional procedures. The European Parliament’s assent is not required. Any change of the European Union's constitution including the provisions on foreign policy making thus requires the consent of all member states. It is therefore surprising that only little scholarly work has so far been dedicated to analyzing member states' policies towards European Political Cooperation (EPC) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) respectively (cf., however, the two volumes edited by Christopher Hill 1983 and 1996). Frequently CFSP-policy has been scrutinized as a part of security policy (e.g. Sauder 1995) or in the context of a state's general integration policy (e.g. the chapters in Laursen/Vanhoonacker 1992 and Hrbek 1997). 

If no explicit reference is made to the time before 1993 when EPC was replaced by CFSP, 'CFSP' and 'CFSP-policy' refers to both CFSP and its predecessor EPC. Though CFSP covers both foreign and security policy and even envisions defence policy I will focus exclusively on traditional foreign policy, i.e. on the non-military (and non-economic) aspects of relations to third countries and international institutions.

Though changes of the Union’s constitution have to be agreed on unanimously and then to be ratified domestically, some member states are especially influential in shaping the outcome of the intergovernmental negotiations and thus of future foreign policy making. Germany certainly belongs to these rather influential member states. This paper which is part of a dissertation project analyzing German, French and British CFSP-policies presents preliminary findings of an analysis of Germany's CFSP policy. Section II. and III. are concerned with conceptual issues including the conceptualization of the dependent variable, i.e. CFSP policy. Section IV. then presents a sketch of pre-unification Germany´s CFSP policy. As will be demonstrated in section V. there is a common rationalist explanation of Germany´s behavior emphasizing a particularly positive ratio of costs and benefits resulting from participation in CFSP for Germany. If this rationalist account holds true, section VI. argues, Germany should be expected to no longer support a strengthening of Europe´s foreign policy regime. Germany´s behavior during the negotiations on CFSP in 1990/92 and 1996/97 that is presented in section VII. clearly defies the rationalist expectation. Section VIII. is therefore dedicated to the development of an alternative explanation based on constructivist reasoning. Attention is paid to the social construction of costs and benefits from CFSP in Parliamentary sessions and at major party conventions. Constructivism seems better suited to account for Germany´s CFSP policy after unificaton (section IX.).

The concept of constitution was introduced to the study of the European polity by Stein 1981. Cf. also Mancini 1991 and Weiler 1997.

For a more comprehensive outline of the dissertation project see Wagner 1999. For helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper I would like to thank especially Derk Bienen, Corinna Freund, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger.

II.	Conceptualisation of EPC/CFSP

The bulk of the work on CFSP is of a rather descriptive nature (cf. Pijpers 1991: 8). One reason may be that much of this work is done by participants who respond to an immense demand for information (Wessels 1993: 12). Obviously information about specific policies (e.g. in former Yugoslavia or in the Middle East) and about the ever-changing institutional set-up in particular meet public demand.

Within the realm of theory the problem of conceptualizing CFSP has received comparatively broad  attention. The issue at stake has been whether CFSP is an entirely new phenomenon of diplomatic cooperation or merely a modernised version of an alliance (Wessels 1993: 15/16) and whether CFSP can be understood as an international actor on its own or should rather be regarded as a system of foreign relations (cf. Hill 1993). This debate reflects the general confusion about the dependent variable in the study of European integration (cf. Ifestos 1987). For an analysis of member states' CFSP policies, the conceptualization of CFSP is of major importance. A conceptualization as an actor on its own, for example, suggests a different perspective on member states' policies than a conceptualization as a mere alliance. However, differing views among member states about the nature of CFSP may themselves influence a member state's CFSP policy and therefore be a part of the dependent variable. It is therefore desirable not to make premature decisions on this point.

One way out of this dilemma is the conceptualization of CFSP as an international regime, i.e. a set of "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures" (Krasner 1983: 2). This conceptualization has the advantage of a "relative neutrality toward the institutional or procedural form of EPC" (Bulmer 1991: 74). Although the regime concept is an accepted tool to describe the status quo of CFSP, it has been accused of an inability to capture the dynamic nature of CFSP (Axt 1993: 258), i.e. the fact that rules, norms and decision-making procedures are themselves regularly reviewed in intergovernmental negotiations. Thus, the regime-concept should be specified so as to incorporate the dynamic nature of CFSP. Thomas Gehring's concept of dynamic international regimes is helpful in this regard. According to Gehring, 

Cf. also Schneider/Seybold 1997: 368: "In practice, EPC constitutes a regime which imposes limits on member states' capacity to act unilaterally. The Union's foreign policy framework is thus comparable to other international regimes where some sort of sanctioning mechanism disciplines the participants."

"[i]n international regimes coming close to this type actors retain the ability to deliberate and decide collectively about matters concerning their common norms. Claims for the modification of norms [...] may become subject to organized communication and collective decision-making." (1994b:398f.)

Dynamic international regimes comprise two dimensions, namely a set of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures governing an issue area on the one hand and a process of organized communication and negotiation about these principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures on the other hand. The latter dimension can be called constitutional. As a part of a dynamic international regime, the CFSP constitution is reviewed on a regular basis. Characteristically, the constitutional documents laying down principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures frequently contain revision clauses.

E.g. the Single European Act provides for a revision of EPC five years after coming into force (cf. Krenzler 1986: 390). A similar clause is included in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union.

III.	Conceptualization of member state's CFSP policy

The conceptualization of CFSP as a dynamic international regime implies that member states' CFSP policies also comprise two dimensions, i.e. a policy within CFSP and a constitutional policy toward CFSP. It is this second, constitutional dimension that this study is concerned with. A member state's policy within CFSP comprises its behaviour inside the Council of the EU where common positions and joint actions are discussed and decided upon as well as the degree of compliance with CFSP provisions. The constitutional dimension refers to a state's behaviour during intergovernmental negotiations about the regime's constitution itself, i.e. about principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. A state's constitutional policy may be observed in particular during the negotiations on the Luxemburg report of 1970, on the Copenhagen report of 1973, on the London report of 1981, on the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration of 1983, on Title III of the Single European Act of 1986, on the provisions of a Common Foreign and Security Policy as part of the Treaty on European Union of 1992 and finally on the review of these provisions as part of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. 

CFSP constitutional policy is particularly suited to examine a state's fundamental approach to the regime, i.e. whether it regards CFSP as an instrument to advance its nationally defined foreign policy or whether it shows a genuine interest in building a common European foreign policy. Of course, a state's policy within CFSP may also point to that state's general approach. However, the indeterminacy of many common positions makes it difficult to differentiate between compliant and non-compliant behaviour and thus to determine the degree of member state compliance. Moreover, there is a general bias towards observing compliant behaviour because common positions are agreed upon unanimously in the first place. Finally, a state's behaviour in Council negotiations is difficult to examine due to the secrecy of the meetings. Taken together, an examination of a member state's constitutional CFSP policy is the best indicator for that state's general approach to CFSP.

IV.	Pre-unification Germany`s CFSP Policy 

At the 1969 summit in The Hague the German government welcomed the French proposal of closer foreign policy coordination among the members of the European Community. When the regime was established a year later, the Chancellor Brandt also agreed to its intergovernmental structure (cf. Müller-Roschach 1980: 220). At an EPC meeting in 1972 the German government suggested the establishment of a small but permanent secretariat (Müller-Roschach 1980: 274f.). Because France insisted on having the secretariat seated in Paris no agreement was reached among the member states.

While Brandt himself is said to have approached institutional questions in a rather pragmatic way, foreign minister Walter Scheel put a stronger emphasis on supranationalism. In a speech in the Bundestag, Scheel regretted the lack of supranational institutions for the time being (cf. Gaddum 1994: 196).

At the beginning of the 1980s Germany for the first time took the initiative for advancing further political integration (cf. Tsakaloyannis 1996:56). Together with the Italians, the German government presented a Draft European Act which referred to a European Union as the aim of the integration process. According to the draft, the European Council would take over a leadership role for both the Community and EPC. In order to further develop EPC, consultations would be intensified and the European Parliament's resolutions would be taken into account more carefully. Furthermore, member states should take every possibility to ease decision-making and thus to reach common positions faster. The Commission should be closely associated to the working of EPC. The European Council would be supported "by an 'expandable secretariat', whose function, according to Bonn, would have been to form a common security assessment, that is something akin to the National Security Council in the US" (Tsakaloyannis 1996:57-58). In the following negotiations, however, Genscher’s proposal was watered down. Finally, the European Council in Stuttgart in 1983 adopted a Solemn Declaration instead of an Act as intended by Germany. Genscher's proposal to establish a permanent secretariat for EPC was not (yet) picked up. On EPC, the Solemn Declaration only mentioned its "necessary reinforcement". 

Foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher first presented his initiative as leader of the Free Democratic Party at a party meeting in Stuttgart in January 1981. Genscher proposed a Treaty on European Union which encompassed the development of a common European foreign policy (cf. Europa-Archiv 1981, No. 6, D 164). Together with a declaration on economic integration, contributed by the Italian foreign minister Colombo, the proposal was presented as a German-Italian-initiative to the member states and the European public in November 1981 (cf. EC Bulletin, November 1981; cf. also Genscher's speech at the European Parliament, printed in: Bulletin der Bundesregierung of November, 23rd, 1981). Compared with the original Genscher plan, the Genscher/Colombo-initiative merely proposed a (legally non-binding) European Act instead of a new Treaty.

The European Parliament may also discuss EPC matters, it may pose oral or written questions to the Council, it may submit recommendations and ask the Council for its opinion.

Solemn Declaration on European Union, quoted from Agence Europe, Documents No. 1263 of June 22nd, 1983.

To the surprise of the other member states Germany and France jointly presented a 'Draft Treaty on European Union' at the Milan European Council in June 1985. The text comprised eleven articles all dedicated to the development of a common European foreign policy. The text emphasized the importance of the European Parliament's participation in EPC and suggested a further development of the respective procedures. With regard to decision-making in the Council unanimity was assumed (Corbett 1987:252). Article 10 mentioned a secretariat supporting the presidency. The secretariat's function was thus more limited than envisioned in Genscher's earlier initiative. Together with a British Text, the Franco-German draft treaty served as a baseline for the negotiations among the foreign ministers. Due to the rather limited reforms proposed in the two texts, the delegations had little difficulties finding a consensus (de Ruyt 1987: 77). Only the decision on whether to incorporate the provisions on EPC into a single Act, as favoured by Germany, was left to the final European Council in Luxembourg. There, the concept of a single act which emphasized EPC`s closeness to the Community won the day. Though the reforms suggested by the German government went only marginally beyond the relevant sections of the Solemn Declaration's part on EPC, they testified to the high importance attached to EPC by the Federal government (Remmert 1994:49/50). The Single European Act of 1986 transformed EPC into a binding Treaty. The establishment of a permanent secretariat seated in Brussels was the Act's most important institutional innovation. However, the "German proposal to appoint a political personality as head of the secretariat was not picked up by the majority of the member states” (Rummel 1996:50).

The German version is published in Europa Archiv 1985, D 449-451.

From the inception of EPC to the signing of the Single European Act, German governments were supportive of a common European foreign policy. From the Genscher initiative of 1981 to the joint Franco-German Draft Treaty in 1985, the German government has pulled its weight for a moderate strengthening of EPC. A special emphasis was put on the establishment of a permanent secretariat. Notwithstanding occasional supranational rhetoric Germany hardly pushed for a communautarization of EPC but accepted or even sympathized with the intergovernmental structure (Gaddum 1994:212, Ifestos 1987: 149).

E.g. Foreign Minister Scheel, in a speech in the German Bundestag on January, 29th, 1971, regretted the lack of supranationalism for the time being (cf. Gaddum 1994:196).

V.	The Common Rationalist Explanation of Germany`s CFSP Policy 

Europe's foreign policy regime is commonly perceived as an instrument at the disposal of the member states to pursue their national foreign policy goals (e.g. Gordon 1997; Pijpers 1991; W.Wallace 1983). Germany in particular is said to have received immense benefits from regime participation. Germany's policy of supporting EPC is thus commonly explained by reference to a positive ratio of costs and benefits arising from regime participation (cf. Bulmer 1997: 64; Rummel 1996: 40; Anderson/Goodman 1993: 24; Bulmer/Paterson 1987: 77f.; Regelsberger/Wessels 1984). 

Scholars have identified several categories of costs and benefits which Europe's foreign policy regime provides for its member states in general (V.1.). As can be shown, Germany has indeed benefitted on an extraordinary scale (V.2.).

1.	Costs and benefits from participation in EPC/CFSP: A General Perspective

In contrast to different ways in which member states benefit from Europe's foreign policy regime scholars have identified only a single category of costs, namely ”limits on member states’ capacity to act unilaterally" (Schneider/Seybold 1997: 369). If the regime were transformed into a single external policy within the Community framework, member states might even be prevented from taking foreign policy actions deemed necessary to secure their national interests. From a rationalist perspective these costs explain why member states have long refrained from codifying EPC in a binding treaty and why member states are reluctant to introduce majority voting into decision-making. Moreover, even when decisions are taken unanimously and remain legally non-binding, member states may lose opportunities of gaining prestige (internationally as well as domestically) (cf. Gordon 1997:80). Scholars agree that a loss of sovereignty and prestige is particularly significant in the area of foreign policy (cf., among others, Bulmer 1991:84).

These costs of a limited capacity to act unilaterally are matched by a number of benefits resulting from participation in Europe's foreign policy regime. The most important benefit that the regime provides for its member states is enhanced influence in international politics: ”A strong European role in the regional and international system is something like a ‘common good’ from which each member state profits if it produces results in the interest of every state of the EC/EU” (Regelsberger/de Schoutheete/Wessels 1997: 4; cf. also de la Serre 1989: 245 and Gordon 1997: 80). Of course, member states, particularly the major powers among them, have a certain capacity to influence international politics on their own. The influence resulting from a pooling of resources among member states, however, far exceeds any single member state's capacity (cf. Ginsberg 1989; Gordon 1997). Thus, even major powers may benefit from a common European foreign policy.
Furthermore, member states are provided with institutionalized opportunities to influence the foreign policies of the other member states (cf. Regelsberger 1993: 183; de la Serre 1989: 245). These opportunities arise from the member states' "commitment to consult partners before adopting final positions or launching national initiatives on all important questions of foreign policy". In recent neorealist theory this category of benefit has been termed "'voice opportunities' [...] defined as institutional characteristics whereby the views of partners (including relatively weaker partners) are not just expressed but reliably have a material impact on the operations of the collaborative arrangement" (Grieco [1995] 1996: 288). Though weaker member states are assumed to benefit most from the voice opportunities provided by the regime, major powers may also use them, especially to elicit support for specific initiatives (Regelsberger 1993: 183).

This is the formula used in the London Report, quoted from Agence Europe Documents No. 1174 of October, 17th, 1981.

Cases in point include France's use of EPC as regards her Middle East policy and Great Britain's endeavor to elicit 'European' support for its policy in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe as well as during the war at the Falklands (cf. Gerbet 1993: 156; Bulmer/Edwards 1992: 150).

Moreover, EPC has an "alibi and legitimation function" (Rummel/Wessels 1983: 40). The regime may serve as a pretext for establishing or changing specific policies. Critics can be isolated with reference to an existing 'European consensus'. Policy changes can be legitimized with reference to 'European standards'. It should be noted that this alibi function "works as regards third countries but also internally vis à vis political forces and public opinion" (ibid. and de la Serre 1989:246). 

Finally, the European foreign policy regime also provides member states with information which otherwise is either not available to them or may only be attained at high costs. Information is provided about third countries and regions by member states that have special relationships to them. In addition, consultation guarantees member states to be informed about other member states' assessments, actions and planned initiatives. Like international regimes in general, Europe's foreign policy regime thus reduces the costs for obtaining information and makes member states' behaviour more predictable to the other member states (cf. de la Serre 1989: 245).

2.	Germany's ratio of costs and benefits

Though Europe's foreign policy regime imposes costs and provides benefits to all member states, Germany is said to have benefitted particularly much from its regime participation (cf., among others, Bulmer 1997: 64; Rummel 1996: 40; Anderson/Goodman 1993: 24). This section will examine this claim by referring to the various categories of costs and benefits.

Germany has benefitted extraordinarily from the enhanced international influence provided by EPC because its own influence was rather limited. When EPC was established, the Federal Republic was not yet a member of the United Nations (Rummel/Wessels 1983: 39). Furthermore it lacked diplomatic relations with a range of countries in Eastern Europe and the Third World (Regelsberger/Wessels 1984: 393). A special German problem was (and maybe still is) that a unilateral foreign policy "is likely to lead to negative reactions, thereby reducing the Federal Republic's influence and room for manoeuvre" (Rummel/Wessels 1983: 40). Within this context, the enhanced international influence achieved by EPC provided the Federal Republic with particular benefits.

The institutionalized voice-opportunities over other member states' foreign policies have also been of special importance to Germany. The German governments used EPC to elicit support for some of its policies, most importantly its Ostpolitik of the late 1960s and early 1970s (cf. Schweitzer 1990: 112; Regelsberger/Wessels 1984: 395). The German government used EPC to inform its partners about its bilateral contacts with Warsaw Pact states and thereby successfully demonstrated its trustworthiness.

The alibi and legitimation function "is certainly useful for all EPC members, but has been of specific importance for the FRG" (Rummel/Wessels 1983: 40). EPC was "a highly useful framework for diverting conflicting pressure away from Bonn and transferring it to an anonymous body where the respective blame can be put on the 'group' or on other partners" (ibid.). EPC "enabled the FRG to take an open stand on critical issues affecting the international system which it would not have been able to do bilaterally" (Schweitzer 1990: 122). This holds true as regards human rights policy towards Eastern Europe and, of course, as regards its Middle East policy where Germany "was hindered [...] by the burden of Nazi attrocities against the Jews" (Bulmer/Paterson 1987: 77; cf. also Aggestam 1998: 9). The Soviet Union could no longer accuse Germany bilaterally of revanchism and destabilization when Germany criticized human rights violations under a European umbrella (Schweitzer 1990: 114). With regard to domestic opposition, critics could be described as isolated in Western Europe (Rummel/Wessels 1983: 41). 

Costs, i.e. limits on its capacity to act unilaterally, used to be low for pre-unification Germany. Germany's capacity to act unilaterally was rather small anyways due to a number of limitations: First, in a legal sense pre-unification Germany was not a fully sovereign state. The Allied rights concerning Germany as a whole were still in place and stressed Germany's formal dependence on the former Allied powers, especially on the United States. Second, the Berlin problem and its neighbouring to the Warsaw Pact made Germany extremely vulnerable and thus dependent on the Western alliance in terms of security (cf. Rummel/Wessels 1983:40). Taken together, these limitations effectively reduced the costs arising from EPC for pre-unification Germany.

For a thorough examination of the political impact of the Allied rights on German foreign policy see Haftendorn/Riecke 1996.

In sum, in the case of pre-unification Germany the benefits arising from Europe's foreign policy regime far exceeded the costs. This explanation, of course, relies heavily on rationalist theorizing: Decision-makers are assumed to be utility-maximizers, i.e. to act upon calculations of costs and benefits. Most importantly, costs and benefits are ‘objectively given’, i.e. their calculations are independent of cognitive or cultural influences.

VI.	A Rationalist Prognosis about Post-Unification German CFSP-Policy

From a rationalist point of view, pre-unification Germany favoured a common European foreign policy because of a positive ratio of costs and benefits. According to rationalists, pre-unification Germany’s leverage for unilateral action was rather small because of its vulnerable position in the East-West-conflict and because of still vivid memories of its past among other member states. If this account is correct, rationalists should expect a policy change after the end of the Cold War and German unification because the ratio of costs and benefits has changed. 

The ratio of costs and benefits has changed because the end of the East-West conflict and German unification have increased Germany's capacity for unilateral action dramatically (cf., among others, Hellmann 1998; Peters 1997: 363):
- First of all, unification brought about a moderate increase in traditional power ressources such as population, territory, GNP and the like (cf. Baumann/Rittberger/Wagner 1998). However, the importance of these material as opposed to immaterial power resources has been contested (cf. Hellmann 1998).
- Unification also brought about full sovereignty, i.e. it removed the remaining legal (and resulting political) restrictions on Germany's capacity to act on its own.
- Most importantly, the end of the East-West-conflict reduced Germany's vulnerability. Germany is no longer contiguous with hostile states but, as German politicians like to put it, 'surrounded by friends'. This, in turn, makes Germany less dependent on its Western allies. As regards CFSP, Germany is thus less dependent on the other member states' support for its foreign policy. 

This increased capacity for unilateral action has increased the costs and reduced the benefits resulting from participation in Europe's foreign policy regime. With regard to international influence the regime has now less additional influence to offer because Germany's own influence has increased. Voice opportunities with view to other member states' foreign policies have become less attractive because the end of the East-West-conflict has rendered the former major powers France and Britain less important. Their instruments of action, e.g. nuclear weapons are badly suited to solve the typical post-cold-war problems such as migration, international terrorism and the like. As a consequence institutionalized voice opportunities over French and British foreign policies have become less attractive. It is difficult to say to what extent Germany still benefits from the regime's 'alibi and legitimation function'. Though other states have encouraged Germany to assume more responsibility in international politics, memories of Germany's past are still vivid and frequently cause resentments even among its closest partners thereby reducing Germany's room of manoeuvre. Finally Germany has regained full sovereignty and new opportunities for unilateral action which increase the costs of regime participation. On balance, a common European foreign policy is much less beneficial for post-unification Germany than it was for the pre-unification Federal Republic.

Thus, from a rationalist point of view that assumes German behaviour to be let by cost/benefit-calculations, Germany is expected to lose its interest in a common European foreign policy after unification to a certain extent. A rationalist account thus derives the (ex post)expectation:

Because Germany’s leverage for unilateral action has dramatically increased after the end of the Cold War and unification, Germany will no longer support a strengthening of the foreign policy regime.

VII.	Testing the Rationalist Prognosis

According to the rationalist perspective, Germany would withdraw its support for a common European foreign policy after the end of the Cold War and unification. Germany’s alleged policy change should certainly have been observable at the 1996/97 negotiations on a revision of the Maastricht Treaty (Bulmer/Paterson 1996). It is less clear, though, whether a policy change could be expected as soon as during the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty, i.e. between April 1990 and December 1991. In general, different kinds of inertia, including bureaucratic routines, are made responsible for time lags between changes in the cost/benefit-ratio and changes in a state’s policy (cf. Anderson/Goodman 1993: 26). 

In CFSP constitutional policy, however, the impact of a changed cost/benefit-ratio on a member state's foreign policy can be expected to be comparatively direct and immediate. Because of the constitutional nature of the policy, interest groups are hardly involved (Gaddum 1994: 214; Moravcsik 1997: 226). As regards bureaucratic politics, CFSP is "the exclusive reserve of the foreign office" (Bulmer/Paterson 1987: 77). What is more, in the realm of foreign policy making, changes in the cost/benefit-ratio have immediate implications. As soon as the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact states started there have been incentives for unilateral action as the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia may illustrate (Crawford 1996). According to Christian Deubner, Germany which has been especially challenged by the new situation in Europe, might be the first country to experience CFSP as a barrier to sensible unilateral foreign policy (Deubner 1995: 84). Last but not least, the intergovernmental character of EPC is more permissive to fast policy changes than the supranational structure governing other policies, e.g. competition policy or foreign trade. This is because there are fewer prerogatives of supranational actors than in the realm of the supranational Community. While the European Court of Justice plays no role at all in CFSP, the involvement of the Commission and of the European Parliament has been rather limited.

If Germany’s CFSP-policy were indeed driven by cost-benefit calculations this should thus have been observable as soon as during the Maastricht negotiations. Even if the process of changing costs and benefits was not finished at the time of the Maastricht negotiations the amount of future costs and benefits was at least uncertain. In such a situation of uncertainty Germany may not have been expected to actively oppose steps towards a common European foreign policy but it should certainly have been expected to refrain from committing itself to further limits on its capacity to act unilaterally.

1.	Germany’s behavior during the Maastricht negotiations 1990/92

In April 1990, a joint French/German initiative brought EPC on the agenda of intergovernmental negotiations. In a joint letter to the president of the Council, the Irish prime minister Charles Haughey, Kohl and Mitterrand proposed to "initiate preparations for an intergovernmental conference on political union" with the particular objective to "define and implement a common foreign and security policy" (quoted from Laursen/Vanhoonacker 1992:276). The joint letter itself was initiated by the German chancellor (Tsakaloyannis 1996:86). In December 1990 a second joint letter further elaborated the Franco-German position: As regards decision-making, "decisions would in principle be adopted unanimously, with the understanding that abstaining should not hinder the adoption of decisions." Furthermore, "when the Council would have to adopt concrete measures required by a given specific situation, it might be decided that the implementing arrangements for these measures may be adopted through majority decisions" (quoted from Laursen/Vanhoonacker 1992:314). The fact that the European Parliament was not given much of a role in the Mitterrand-Kohl letter was perceived as a concession by the German side (Hill 1996: 50). In a report to the Bundestag the German government indeed claimed to have pulled its weight for a more extensive participation of the European Parliament in CFSP matters: According to the report, the German government preferred to have the European Parliament fully informed and its views duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament is envisioned to hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy. However, according to the German government, the granting of a veto power to the European Parliament would exceed the usual level of Parliamentary participation in foreign affairs and would be likely to inhibit the Union's capacity to act swiftly and effectively.

Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Stärkung der gesetzgeberischen Befugnisse des Europäischen Parlaments vom 16.4.1993 (Bundestags-Drucksache 12/4733).

The question of whether the foreign policy regime should remain outside the Rome Treaty or should be transferred to the Community became one of the most controversial issues during the negotiations. The German delegation sided with those who criticized the Luxembourg Non-Paper of April 1991 for keeping CFSP separate from the Treaty establishing the EC. However, when only a few months later the Dutch presidency presented a single treaty that also comprised a title on CFSP it was only Belgium that supported this proposal (cf. Corbett 1993). Notwithstanding supranational rhetoric (e.g. Stavenhagen 1991) German support for a communitarization of foreign policy was rather limited.

Taken together, Germany`s policy during the Maastricht negotiations aimed at a strengthening of the foreign policy regime. Except for its withdrawal of support for a communitarization of CFSP, Germany never blocked proposals for a strengthening of the regime. At the same time special emphasis was placed on the introduction of qualified majority voting in common foreign policy making.

2. Germany’s behavior during the Amsterdam negotiations 1996/97	

Only three years after the Maastricht Treaty came into effect another intergovernmental conference was convened to review important parts of the Maastricht accords including CFSP. Since the conference’s agenda was well-known in advance governments had a better chance to thoroughly prepare their positions than in 1990/92.

In the agreement establishing the Christian/liberal coalition the governing parties concur that the most important aim of their European policy was ”the consolidation of the European Union by [...] its further development both internally and externally”. According to the agreement, CFSP should be deepened and transferred to the Community framework. There should be a more frequent use of community procedures, especially of qualified majority voting. 

Koalitionsvereinbarung, Bonn, November, 11th, 1994 (author's translation).

The extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) within CFSP indeed became a German priority during the 1996/97 negotiations on CFSP. German officials emphasized that the introduction of QMV would not imply that member states ran the risk of being outvoted. Rather, QMV would facilitate consensus-building in an indirect way: If decisions could be taken by qualified majority, delegations could no more be instructed to block decisions but would have to engage in searching for compromises. Though the German government itself was prepared to adopt qualified majority voting as a general rule, emphasis was put on reaching a common position with France. Eventually, the Franco-German guidelines on CFSP adopted in Freiburg in February 1996, enumerated several possibilities to ease decision-making including constructive abstention which eventually was adopted by the conference.

Cf. the article by political director Wolfgang Ischinger and European correspondent Eberhard Koelsch "Was Mehrheitsentscheidungen erreichen können" in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of May 2nd, 1997.

Author’s interview with an official of the foreign office.

According to Article 23 TEU "[d]ecisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously.  Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions. When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph.  In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union."

The German government agreed with the other member states that a body for analysis, forecasting and planning would enhance the Union's capability to actively pursue foreign policy and thus generally supported the respective proposals. According to Bonn, the unit  should be controlled by the secretary general of the Council which in turn would be accountable to the member states. The German government was reluctant to support the establishment of a ‘Mr./Ms. CFSP’ as envisioned by France. When searching for a high representative to be appointed after the ratification of the Amsterdam treaty, foreign minister Kinkel preferred a person with a rather low profile (cf. DIE ZEIT of November, 12th 1998).

Cf. Declaration of the federal government on current issues of European policy to the Bundestag, in: Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung  No. 51 of June, 26th, 1995 and Foreign Office, ‘German aims at the intergovernmental conference’ of March, 26th 1996.

The pledge for a communitarization of CFSP was hardly pushed by the German government. Nor did the German delegation insist on an enhanced role of the Commission though its opposition to a Mr. CFSP has been interpreted as an endeavor to defend the Commission’s present role (cf. Stark 1998: 146). Though foreign minister Kinkel - in a joint declaration with the Italian foreign minister Susanna Agnelli - called for a much stronger involvement of the European Parliament in CFSP, an internal draft of possible treaty reforms left the respective article (J.7 TEU) unchanged. However, the negotiations about the financing of joint actions revealed a positive German attitude towards a closer involvement of the European Parliament. In Maastricht, the member states had decided that in the second pillar  administrative expenditures would be covered by the community budget while operational expenditures would be charged to the member states unless the Council unanimously decides otherwise (Art. J.11). In practice, this led to lengthy and cumbersome discussions about appropriate burden sharing and to the (mis-)declaration of operational expenditures as administrative expenditure (Schmalz 1997). At the 1996/97 negotiations Germany pushed to include operational expenditures in the Community budget and to treat them as non-obligatory expenditures. While the inclusion of CFSP expenditures in the Community budget mainly symbolized CFSP’s affiliation to the Community, their treatment as non-obligatory would have given the European Parliament the last word in determining their amount.

Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, however, has interpreted the German objection to a Mr./Mrs. CFSP as a rejection of "proposals amounting to France's leadership in Europe" because "a CFSP leader may have run against German interests, even if the position had not been filled by a French person, because he or she may have followed French ambitions and designs" (Le Gloannec 1998: 26f.).

Cf. Joint Declaration by German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel and Italian foreign minister Susanna Agnelli on the occasion of their meeting in Porto Santo Stefano on July, 14th/15th, 1995 and Foreign Office, Internal Paper of October, 14th, 1996.

Cf. Foreign Office, Internal Paper on CFSP of October, 14th, 1996 and ‘Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Bemühungen zur Stärkung der gesetzgeberischen Befugnisse des Europäischen Parlaments 1997' of February, 25th, 1998 (Drs. 13/10011).

In sum, Germany continued to pull its weight for a strengthening of Europe’s foreign policy regime during the 1996/97 negotiations. The German delegation particularly pushed for qualified majority voting and for the European Parliament’s right to determine the CFSP budget. Its reluctance to support the French idea of a Mr./Ms. CFSP did not necessarily indicate a decreased interest in a common European foreign policy but may be interpreted as an attempt to block further moves towards intergovernmentalism. 

3.	Evaluating the Rationalist Prognosis

Neither during the 1990/91 nor during the 1996/97 negotiations on the constitution of Europe’s foreign policy regime the German government’s behaviour revealed any signs of a decreased interest in a common European foreign policy. Particularly Germany’s support for the introduction and extension of qualified majority voting must be interpreted as an endeavour to strengthen the regime. Furthermore, Germany backed a range of measures intended to enhance the Union’s capacity to actively develop a common policy, such as the establishment of a strategic planing unit and the granting of a right of initiative to the Commission. It is true that Germany did not actively push for a communitarization of CFSP. But this should not be taken as an indicator for a decreasing interest in a common European foreign policy, as Anne-Marie Le Gloannac (1998) and Elisabeth Aggestam (1998) have suggested. The discrepancy between a supranational rhetoric on the one hand and a rather intergovernmental policy on the other hand had already been a feature of pre-unification Germany’s EPC policy (cf. Müller-Roschach 1980; Regelsberger/Wessels 1984: 404; Remmert 1994: 40). Obviously the rationalist perspective has failed to explain the case of post-unification German CFSP policy.

VIII.	Developing an Alternative, Constructivist Explanation of Germany's Post-Unification CFSP-Policy
Constructivism has become the major opponent of rationalist theorizing and may thus serve as a reservoir for the development of an alternative explanation. Constructivists would not deny that Germany’s CFSP policy is driven by German interests which in turn are based upon costs and benefits. Constructivists, however, criticize rationalist explanations of taking interests, costs and benefits as exogeneously given. Constructivism "seeks to problematize the identities and interests of states, to show that and how they are socially constructed" (Ruggie 1998: 33). Thus, from a constructivist point of view, costs and benefits arising from a common European foreign policy cannot simply be derived from a state’s capacity for unilateral foreign policy; they are seen as socially constructed and influenced by what some authors have called 'norms' (e.g. Finnemore 1996; Klotz 1996), ‘identity’ (e.g. Jepperson/Wendt/Katzenstein 1996: 33; Ingebritsen/Larson 1997; Marcussen/Risse 1997) or ‘(political) culture’ (cf. Berger 1996; Hudson 1997; Ulbert 1997). 

Constructivists have given a variety of answers to the question of whose identity, whose culture and whose norms should be taken into account when examining the social construction of a given policy. The answers range from the entire community of states to the members of a specific international institution to domestic social groups.

In the case of CFSP the regime norms are too weak to have a significant impact on the definition of member states' interests (Katzenstein 1997: 293). Rather, member states' interests in Europe's foreign policy constitution are constructed domestically. In the following section I want to pay attention to two types of fora where the social construction of CFSP's costs and benefits for Germany can be expected to take place. The first forum is the Bundestag, i.e. the first chamber of the national parliament which of course has debated the pros and cons of strengthening Europe's foreign policy regime (VIII.1.). The second forum are the conventions of the major political parties, namely of the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) (VIII.2.). 

1.	The Social Construction of CFSP Constitutional Policy in the Bundestag

1.1.	The Parliament as a forum of social construction

From a constructivist point of view, the national parliament can be perceived as a forum where representatives of society publicly debate the appropriateness of policies. Fundamental conceptions of what is perceived to be beneficial and desirable can be observed in parliamentary debates (cf. Breuning 1995, 1997). Because deputies wish to be (re-)elected they can be expected to pay close attention to the values and norms prevalent in their constituencies. The social construction of appropriate policies in Parliament can thus be seen as embedded in a broader social context. Because citizens are the major addressees of parliamentary discussion, speakers try to call upon societal norms and values.

Parliamentary debates do not simply convey societal norms and values to the government which in turn implements them. Parliamentary debates are also a forum for the government to present and explain its policies. In parliamentary (as opposed to presidential) democracies such as Germany the government is supported by the governing parties in defending government policies. From a constructivist perspective, it is important to note that in Parliament the government has to justify its policies with reference to commonly accepted beliefs, values and norms (cf. Lotz 1997: 73). Taken together, in parliamentary debates the social construction of appropriate policies works in both ways, i.e. societal norms and values are picked up by the MPs and are articulated vis-à-vis the government. At the same time the government itself contributes to the social construction of its own policy by explaining and justifying it.

The Bundestag was not much involved in preparing the German position for the Maastricht negotiations (cf. Weber-Panariello 1995; Goetz 1996). The government regarded the negotiations as a diplomatic exercise which clearly fell into the executive’s responsibility. The Bundestag and its committee on foreign affairs were informed only sporadically. Though the state of the negotiations was discussed from time to time, the main debates about the treaty's contents took place on the occasion of ratification, namely in a six-hour debate on October 8^th 1992 and in a five-hour debate on December 2^nd 1992.

The Social Democrats put the state of the negotiations on the plenary agenda on October, 17^th, 1991. Further discussion took place on November, 6^th, 1991 and  December, 5^th, 1991.

Poor parliamentary involvement and missing public debate were in part held responsible for rising euroscepticism in Germany and throughout the Community. With the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty a new article was inserted into the German Basic Law which provided for extended participation in European affairs of both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, the second chamber of Parliament where the Länder governments are represented. Since then the Federal government has a constitutionally based obligation to inform the Bundestag early and comprehensively and to take its views into consideration. The Bundestag on its part established a special committee for the European Union in order to enhance its capacity to debate government policy thoroughly and to react quickly to new developments (cf. Hölscheidt/Schotten 1994; Lang 1997). During the 1996 intergovernmental conference, the German government indeed endeavoured to inform the Bundestag’s European Affairs committee extensively. Foreign minister Kinkel's personal representative at the intergovernmental conference, Werner Hoyer, informed the committee about the negotiations on a weekly base.  Since the aim of the 1996 conference was to review several parts of the Maastricht Treaty (including CFSP) the agenda was well known in advance and comparatively easy to prepare for. 

The Bundestag passed two resolutions on the reform of the Maastricht Treaty. The first resolution was passed with regard to the Madrid European Council in December 1995 where the reflection group’s report was presented. The second resolution was passed on June, 11^th, 1997, i.e. at the time of the final negotiations in Amsterdam. Both resolutions, of course, were discussed in a plenary session. The contents of the final agreement, the Amsterdam Treaty, were again discussed on the occasion of ratification on December, 11^th, 1997 and on March, 5^th, 1998. 

The reflection group comprised personal representatives of the foreign ministers and of the President of the Commission as well as two MEPs. The group was set up in June 1994 and commissioned to prepare the intergovernmental conference by discussing possible options for reform. The reflection group submitted their report to the European Council in December 1995.

Taken together, between 1992 and 1998 the Bundestag has spent more than twenty-two hours on debating reforms of the European Union`s constitution. Though the issue of a Common Foreign and Security Policy was less prominent than monetary union in 1992 or employment policy in 1997/98 there is still enough material to analyze the social construction of costs and benefits of a European foreign policy in the German Bundestag. Emphasis will be put on the speeches of those Members of Parliament who are not at the same time members of the federal government. 

The plenary discussions in 1991 are not yet examined but will be included in the final version of this study.

1.2.	Preliminary findings

In general, deputies perceived the negotiations about the Common Foreign and Security Policy as one of the most important parts of the intergovernmental conferences. Missing attention to the developments in CFSP was criticized by opponents. Across parties CFSP was seen as the right answer to recent developments in European and international politics. The war in former Yugoslavia was frequently evoked as the symbol for these developments. Across parties, speakers pointed to the developments in Yugoslavia in order to illustrate the necessity of strengthening CFSP. No single speaker accused the European Community of having failed in former Yugoslavia. On the contrary, the Community was defended for not being given the possibility to contribute to peace in the region effectively. 

Cf. speech by Rudolf Seiters on June, 11^th, 1997 who criticized the motion tabled by the Social Democrats on European policy for not mentioning CFSP.

The one exception was the speech by the independent Ortwin Lowack on December, 2^nd, 1992 who argued that CFSP would not have improved Europe`s performance in former Yugoslavia because Europe could have embarked on a common policy if it would have had the political will to do so. The conflicts between Germany, France and Britain, according to Lowack, were so profound that CFSP would not have made a difference.

Cf. speeches by Hartmut Soell (SPD) and Ulrich Irmer (F.D.P.) on October, 8^th, 1992 and by Peter Kittelmann (CDU) on December, 2^nd, 1992.

Cf. speech by Ulrich Irmer (F.D.P.) on December, 2^nd, 1992.

The transformation of Europe was not perceived as yielding additional opportunities for unilateral German foreign policy. Quite the opposite, national foreign policy was seen as antagonistic to the current developments. The Green deputy Kristin Heyne stated that there had been a relapse into the approaches of the 1920s and 1930s, and the Social Democrat Hartmut Soell wanted the tendency of a renationalisation of foreign policies to be countered by closer European cooperation. Benefits from an enhanced influence in international affairs were hardly mentioned, though Christian Schmidt wanted to strengthen CFSP as an ”Atlantic counterpart to the United States” that rendered European positions more influential.

Cf. speech by Renate Hellwig (CDU) on December, 2^nd, 1992.

Speech by Kristin Heyne (Greens) on December, 7^th, 1995.

Speech by Hartmut Soell (SPD) on October, 8^th, 1992.

Speech by Christian Schmidt (CSU) on December, 11^th, 1997.

Majority voting was seen as the most important means to improve the Union's capacity to act. Interestingly, no speaker considered the possibility of being outvoted and of being unable to pursue important national policies. Rather, qualified majority voting was seen as enabeling the Union to act when a single member state refused to accept a sensible and acceptable compromise. The Social Democrats were critisized for linking the introduction of qualified majority voting to the communitization of CFSP. According to Rudolf Seiters (CDU) this linkage would perpetuate the national veto and would thus weaken the common foreign policy. The establishment of a common planning unit was proposed in 1992 and was consequently welcomed in 1997. The planning unit was expected to help the Union to escape from merely reactive policy and to provide it with the means for preventive diplomacy. The dominant line of criticism stated that the Maastricht and Amsterdam accords were insufficient. Occasionally, the intergovernmental character of CFSP and its lack of parliamentary and juridical control were critized.

Cf. speech by Rudolf Seiters (CDU) on June, 11^th, 1997.

Speech by Rudolf Seiters (CDU) on December, 7^th, 1995.

Cf. speeches by Karl Lamers (CDU) on December, 2^nd, 1992 and by Rudolf Seiters (CDU) on June, 11^th, 1997.

Cf. speeches by Hartmut Soell (SPD) on October, 8^th, 1992, by Karl Lamers (CDU) on December, 2^nd, 1992 and by Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD) on March, 5^th, 1998.

Speech by Christian Sterzing (Greens) on June, 11^th, 1997.

Taken together, CFSP was not perceived as an instrument for pursuing nationally defined foreign policy goals. Because opportunities for unilateral action were not perceived, the foreign policy regime was not regarded as imposing costs. At the center of controversy were trade-offs between commonly agreed aims, e.g. between the desire to introduce and extend qualified majority voting on the one hand, and the preference to communitarize CFSP on the other.

2.	The Social Construction of CFSP Constitutional Policy at Party Conventions

From a constructivist point of view, party conventions can be seen as another important forum where the social construction of appropriate policies takes place. Of course, this kind of forum is closely connected to the parliamentary forum discussed above. Frequently, the same people give speeches in Parliament and at party conventions. However, there are also some significant differences between the two fora.

First of all, the speakers at party conventions have a more heterogeneous background than speakers in parliamentary debates. Though professional politicians certainly dominate both fora, ”simple delegates” may also contribute to the discussion at party conventions. Whenever issues of European integration are discussed, members of the European Parliament frequently participate in the debate and add a further, ”European” perspective. Moreover, guest speakers, especially experts or foreign politicians, may be invited to present their views. Second, the desired position of the party instead of a specific governmental proposal is at the center of debate. For the governing parties, there is thus no necessity to defend government policy. Similarly, there are weaker incentives for the opposition parties to criticize the government policies. Since a constructivist explanation focuses on influential and prevalent constructions of political reality, the analysis of party conventions should be limited to the major parties (Volksparteien), i.e. in the German case to the SPD and the CDU.

2.1.	The Social Construction of CFSP Constitutional Policy at the SPD party conventions: preliminary findings

The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy was frequently on the agenda of the biannual Social Democratic Party conventions. At the Bremen convention of May 1991 Europe`s foreign policy regime was discussed on the occasion of a resolution called ‘European Perspectives of the SPD’. One out of three working groups at the 1993 convention in Wiesbaden was dedicated to ‘Germany’s role in the world’ where ‘Germany in Europe’ was a major issue. At the Mannheim convention two years later CFSP was discussed in the context of a resolution titled ‘We need Europe’.

In general, speakers favoured a strengthening of the European foreign policy capacity. In 1991, with regard to the Gulf crisis, France and Great Britain were criticized for returning to national foreign policies. In addition to the Gulf crisis, EPC/CFSP was perceived to have failed in former Yugoslavia and Somalia. In reaction to these failures, the Social Democrats wanted to strengthen rather than to abolish the regime. In the words of Klaus Hänsch MEP, one should not complain about the helplessness in the Balkans and at the same time oppose a more powerful Europe. 

Cf. Speech by Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, protocol of the SPD convention in Bremen, May, 28^th to 31^st, 1991, p.260.

Protocol of the SPD convention in Wiesbaden, November, 16^th to 19^th, 1993, p.661.

Similar to the debates in the Bundestag, lost opportunities for unilateral action were not mentioned and therefore not perceived as costs. However, the possible costs of reduced parliamentary control were extensively discussed at the Mannheim convention of 1995. Magdalena Hoff MEP criticized the draft resolution for linking qualified majority voting to having the European Parliament decide on an equal footing. According to Mrs. Hoff, this demand was unrealistic and amounted to simply blocking a strengthening of CFSP. The majority of speakers, however, defended the resolution’s formula on the ground that only a strengthened European Parliament could reduce the democratic deficit. Mrs. Wieczorek-Zeul stated that, as a parliamentarian, she would be ready to transfer her competences to another Parliament, namely the EP, but not to the secrecy of Council meetings.

Cf. speeches by Evelyne Gebhardt, MEP, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul and Horst Fischer-Rohn, protocol of the SPD convention in Mannheim, November, 14^th to 17^th, 1995, pp.794, 800 and 804.

2.2.	The Social Construction of CFSP Constitutional Policy at the CDU’s conventions: preliminary findings

Germany’s preferred policy towards the European Union has been a major topic at several of the annual CDU party conventions in the 1990s. In 1991 the Christian Democrats discussed a manifesto supposed to give guidelines for the new political situation of the 1990s. Issues of foreign and European policy were discussed in a special forum where several experts were invited to present their views on German foreign policy. In 1992 an entire convention day was exclusively dedicated to the discussion of European policy. In 1994 issues of European integration were discussed in the context of a new party platform (Grundsatzprogramm). In 1995 discussion centered around the party’s ‘European guidelines’ (Europapolitische Leitsätze). Without discussion, a special resolution concerning the future development of CFSP was adopted in Hannover in 1996.

These guests included the foreign policy experts Arnulf Baring and Hans-Peter Schwarz who are both said to be influenced by realist thinking and have been regarded as "eurosceptics" (Hellmann 1996: 10). According to Baring, Germany "has paid too much attention to the (structurally different) interests of its western partners" (Baring 1995, quoted from Hellmann 1996: 11). Following Hans Peter Schwarz, "Germany's European policy will in the future for objective reasons become more selfish, more calculated and cost-conscious, less flexible and primarily fixed on a rather  narrowly defined national interest" (Schwarz 1994, quoted from Hellmann 1996: 11).

The debates about costs and benefits of a strengthened European foreign policy regime within the CDU exhibit a great deal of similarities to those within the SPD. Summarizing the discussion about the new Grundsatzprogramm in 1994, Friedrich Merz observed that no-one questioned the aim of a strenghtened CFSP. Following Friedbert Pflüger, common European policies were of an intrinsical value, and Elmar Brok stated that the German national interest, closely examined, conformed to European interests. The strengthening of the CFSP was perceived as a necessary consequence of the Community's weakness in dealing with former Yugoslavia. Difficulties and outright failures were attributed to the regime's intergovernmental structure, especially to missing possibilities of qualified majority voting.

Protocol of the 5^th federal convention in Hamburg, February, 21^st to 23^rd, 1994, p. 350.

Protocol of the second federal convention in Dresden, December, 15^th to 17^th, 1991, p.600.

Protocol of the second federal convention in Dresden, December 15^th to 17^th, 1991, p.149f.

Cf. Hans-Gert Pöttering, MEP, protocol of the second federal convention, Dresden, December, 15^th to 17t^h, 1991, p.194f.; Renate Hellwig, protocol of the third federal party convention, Düsseldorf, October, 26^th to 28^th, 1992, p.230; Thomas Mann, MEP, protocol of the 7th federal convention in Karlsruhe, October, 16^th to 18^th, 1995, p.91.

Cf. Elmar Brok, MEP, protocol of the second federal convention in Dresden, December, 15^th to 17^th, 1991, p.593; Rudolf Seiters, protocol of the 7^th federal convention, Karlsruhe, October, 16^th to 18^th, 1995, p.89

Germany's increased room for manoeuvre was not ignored, but increased costs from lost opportunities for unilateral action were not perceived to be a consequence. Alfred Dregger, however, regarded a complete transfer of foreign and security policy from Bonn to Brussels as undesirable and interpreted the Federal Constitutional Court's sentence in this way.

Cf. speeches by Karl Lamers and Heinrich Vogel, MP, protocol of the second federal convention, Dresden, December, 15t^h to 17t^+h, 1991, p.568 and 575.

Protocol of the 5^th federal convention in Hamburg, September, 12^th to 14^th 1993, p. 347f.

IX.	Evaluating the Constructivist Explanation
In the three fora examined, the costs and benefits for Germany resulting from a strengthening of CFSP were perceived in similar ways. Most importantly, augmented opportunities for unilateral action were either not perceived at all or not regarded as desirable. Lost opportunities for unilateral action were therefore not perceived as costs. At the same time, the transformation of the international system was interpreted as yielding additional incentives for a strengthened European foreign policy regime. The developments in former Yugoslavia and the Community's reaction to them were cited frequently. The conclusions drawn from politicians in these fora aimed at overcoming the barriers which were perceived to block a strengthening of the regime. Qualified majority voting was regarded as the most important means in order to strengthen CFSP. Furthermore, the regime's intergovernmental structure was perceived as a further obstacle. The establishment of a common plannig unit was also welcomed.

There is a significant convergence between the domestic preferences on CFSP policy and the government policy during the negotiations in 1990/92 and 1996/97. Thus, post-unification Germany's CFSP policy may be traced back to the domestic social construcion of CFSP's costs and benefits for Germany. Because government officials can be assumed to have some influence on the processes of social construction in the governing parties, one might criticize the constructivist explanation of being biased. However, the analysis of SPD party conventions has demonstrated that the social construction of costs and benefits outside the governing parties takes place along similar lines.

X.	Conclusion

Germany´s CFSP policy until unification and the end of the East-West-conflict could be explained by a rationalist approach which stated that any member state´s policy towards Europe´s foreign policy regime was informed by that state´s costs and benefits resulting from regime participation. From a rationalist perspective pre-unification Germany had a particularly positive ratio of costs and benefits: Germany did not have to bear significant costs due to its limited sovereignty and capacity to act. At the same time, Germany benefitted from an enhanced influence in international affairs, from voice-opportunities over other states´ foreign policies and from the regime´s alibi and legitimation function.

According to that rationalist perspective Germany´s ratio of costs and benefits changed dramatically as a result of unification and the end of the East-West-conflict. From a rationalist perspective Germany was therefore assumed to change its CFSP policy and to become less supportive of strengthening the regime. Germany´s behaviour during the Maastricht and Amsterdam negotiations, however, clearly defies that expectation.
An examination of both Parliamentary debates and discussions at major party conventions   revealed that CFSP´s costs and benefits were perceived in an entirely different way than suggested by rationalist theorizing. Augmented opportunities for Germany to act unilaterally were not perceived as reducing the regime´s benefits. In explaining post-unification Germany´s CFSP policy, the constructivist account performed much better than its rationalist counterpart. 

How can it be explained that rationalism and constructivism can each account for a certain time period in Germany´s CFSP policy? Because the social construction of EPC´s costs and benefits in the 1970s and 1980s was not examined it remains an open question whether constructivism would have performed well in explaining Germany´s behaviour until unification. However, if constructivism had performed well it certainly would have been critisized of merely rationalizing given costs and benefits. It is indeed striking that the costs and benefits as perceived in post-unification Germany strongly resemble the costs and benefits that rationalists have identified for pre-unification Germany. It therefore seems plausible that the social construction of CFSP´s costs and benefits emerged from the experiences by German governments in the 1970s and 1980s. Because German governments successfully used EPC as a vehicle for emancipation, Europe´s foreign policy regime may increasingly have been perceived as something valuable in its own right. The costs and benefits experienced by successive German governments, of course, were communictated to Parliament and to political parties which in turn may have taken over the government´s perspective on the regime´s costs and benefits. When a strengthening of the regime was negotiated in 1990/91 and 1996/97 this perspective on the regime´s costs and benefits may have been still present within Parliament and political parties. As a result, both major parties and Parliament expected the government to continue its policy of supporting CFSP.

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